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Resumo
O artigo tem o objetivo de analisar os fundamentos e os 
métodos de alteração das Constituições estaduais nos 
Estados Unidos. Reconhece um certo padrão nos proces-
sos politicos de mudança das Constituições estaduais, 
mas também destaca que, em cada caso, alguns grupos 
sociais específicos atuam de modo mais intenso. Além 
disso, analisa como forças políticas externas podem in-
fluenciar as alterações das Constituições estaduais. Por 
fim, conclui que, em regra, os Estados Unidos estão atu-
almente passando por um período em que existe uma 
certa resistência quanto à criação de novas Constituições 
estaduais, havendo uma maior preferência popular por 
alterações pontuais nas Constituições já existentes.
Palavras-chave: Alteração constitucional; Constitui-
ção estadual; Estados Unidos; Federalismo; Emenda 
constitucional.
Abstract
The article aims to analyze the fundamentals and the meth-
ods of state constitutional changes in the United States. It 
recognizes a certain pattern in the political processes of 
state constitutional changes, but it also points out that, in 
each case, some specific social groups act more intensely. 
Furthermore, it analyzes how external political forces can 
influence changes in state Constitutions. Finally, it con-
cludes that, as a rule, the United States is currently under-
going a period in which there is a certain resistance to the 
creation of new state Constitutions, with greater popular 
preference for specific changes in the existing Constitutions.
Keywords: Constitutional change; State Constitution; Unit-
ed States; federalism; constitutional amendment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution mandates that each state (component unit) have “a re-
publican form of government” and empowers the federal government to enforce this 
requirement.1 It also asserts its supremacy and that of other federal law, including stat-
utes and treaties, over state constitutions, as well as over other state laws.2 Yet these 
requirements and restrictions are not particularly burdensome, and if one compares 
the “constitutional space” available to state constitution-makers in the United States 
with that available to their counterparts in other federations, there are far greater op-
portunities for constitutional innovation and experimentation in the United States than 
in most other federations.3 
The states have made use of the broad constitutional space available to them, 
changing their constitutions frequently, either by totally replacing them (constitutional 
revision) or by amending them. Altogether the fifty states have adopted 145 constitu-
tions, with Louisiana and Georgia leading the pack with eleven and ten constitutions 
respectively.4 Michigan, with four constitutions, is closer to the norm.5 States also have 
regularly amended their constitutions: as of 2013, current state constitutions had been 
amended more than 10,000 times—indeed, Alabama, which has the nation’s (and the 
world’s) longest constitution, adopted ten amendments in 2012 alone.6 These data re-
veal only part of the story, because they do not include amendments to earlier state 
1  U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 4.  For discussion of the clause’s relevance for state constitutional development, see 
MERRITT, Deborah Jones. The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century. Colum-
bia Law Review, New York, vol. 88, n. 1, p. 1-78, jan. 1988.
2  U.S. Const., Art. VI, Sec. 2. This supremacy extends to congressional enactments setting requirements for 
what should be included or excluded in the constitutions of territories seeking statehood. See TARR, G. Alan. 
Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. p. 39-41.
3  On the concept of “constitutional space” and its pertinence to the comparative study of sub-national consti-
tutions in various federal systems, see BURGESS, Michael D.; TARR, G. Alan; MARKO, Josef (Ed.). Constitution-
al dynamics in federal systems: sub-national perspectives. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2012; and WILLIAMS, Robert F.; TARR, G. Alan (Ed.). Federalism, sub-national constitutions, and minority 
rights. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2004.
4  For a listing of the number and years of constitutions adopted by the various states, see THE COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOVERNMENTS. Book of the States. 2012. Available on: <http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/
content-type/bos-2012>. p. 11, tbl. 1.1.
5  THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. Book of the States. 2012. Available on: <http://knowledgecenter.
csg.org/kc/category/content-type/bos-2012>.
6  THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. Book of the States. 2012. Available on: <http://knowledgecenter.
csg.org/kc/category/content-type/bos-2012>.
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constitutions. For example, the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 was amended 535 times 
before its replacement in 1974, which occurred only after the electorate in 1970 had re-
jected all fifty-three proposed amendments.7 Michigan, with sixty-eight amendments 
from 1963 to 2012, is again closer to the national norm.8  
As important as the frequency of constitutional change are the uses states have 
made of the opportunities presented to them, that is, the types of changes they have 
introduced. States have charted their own constitutional direction by adopting provi-
sions that have no analogue at the federal level.  In some instances, these distinctive 
provisions have been necessitated by the nature of state constitutions.  For example, 
given the plenary character of state legislative power and state courts’ tendency to con-
strue that power broadly, state constitution-makers have found it necessary to detail 
in the fundamental law the limitations they sought to impose on state legislatures.9 In 
other instances, state constitution-makers have felt obliged to deal with matters, such 
as local government and education, because the federal Constitution does not address 
them.10 But in many instances the distinctive provisions state constitution-makers have 
crafted represent free choices, oftentimes responding to the constitutional experience 
of the state. These provisions have addressed the process of legislation—for example, 
state regulation of legislative procedures designed to ensure a more open and orderly 
deliberative process, such as bans on special legislation and requirements of commit-
tee referral and of multiple readings of bills.11 The provisions have also created alterna-
tive paths for legislation, allowing the people themselves to decide on public policy 
through mechanisms such as the initiative and referendum.12 Distinctive state provi-
sions have structured the selection, powers, and operation of the branches of state 
7  CARLETON, Mark T. Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Tulane Law Review, New Orleans, 
vol. 54, p. 560-588, 1980; and STURM, Albert L. The Development of American State Constitution. Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism, Oxford, vol. 12, n. 1, p. 57-98, jan./mar. 1982. p. 80.
8  See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. Book of the States. 2012. Available on: <http://knowledgecen-
ter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/bos-2012> for information through 2011, and see <http://ballotpedia.
org/wiki/index.php/Michigan_2012_ballot_measures>  for information on 2012. Prior to the adoption of Mich-
igan’s current constitution, voters in the state in a single decade  (1946-1956) approved 23 of 28 proposed 
amendments proposed, and this more frequent amendment might have suggested the need for comprehen-
sive change. STURM, Albert L. Thirty years of State Constitution-making: 1938-1968. New York: National 
Municipal League, 1970. p. 102.  The need for revision was also suggested by the failure to secure needed 
reforms via constitutional amendment.  For example, “efforts to secure county home rule were defeated in 
four separate constitutional referendums between 1934 and 1944.” See BOWMAN, Anne O’Malley; KEARNEY, 
Richard C. The Resurgence of the States. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986. p. 248.
9  See WILLIAMS, Robert F. The Law of American State Constitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. ch.4.
10   To some extent the decision to address these matters is a matter of choice, not necessity.  On the develop-
ment of state provisions dealing with education, see ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the wrong plac-
es: why State Constitutions contain America’s positive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. ch. 5.
11  See WILLIAMS, Robert F. State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and 
Judicial Enforcement. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford, vol. 17, n. 1, p. 91-114, jan./mar. 1987.
12  See BENJAMIN, Gerald. Constitutional Amendment and Revision. In: WILLIAMS, Robert F.; TARR, G. Alan (Ed.). 
State Constitutions for the Twenty-first Century. vol. 3. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006.
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government—term limits, the multi-member executive, the item veto, the recall, and 
the election of judges are prime examples. They have also dealt in detail with public 
finance—taxing, borrowing, and spending—and they have committed the state gov-
ernment to various policy goals, such as a clean environment and a quality education 
for all children.13 Finally, the states have recognized rights not found in the federal Con-
stitution--such as guarantees of privacy, of gender equality, and of a right to hunt and 
fish—as well as other distinctive substantive restrictions on governmental action, such 
as balanced budget requirements and limitations on state and local borrowing.14
The states’ vigorous use of the constitutional space available to them raises sev-
eral questions. Some relate to the progress of constitutional change over time. Is state 
constitutional innovation a continuous phenomenon, or have there been eras in which 
state constitutional reform has been particularly prevalent and others in which it has 
not?  Summary figures describing the level of state constitutional volatility—the num-
ber of constitutions and constitutional amendments—obscure major variations in the 
form and frequency of constitutional change. The nineteenth century was an era of 
extraordinary constitution-making, with states holding 144 constitutional conventions 
and adopting ninety-fourt constitutions.15 But during the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, the pace of constitutional revision slowed as states adopted only twenty-
three new constitutions, with five of these the original constitutions in states that were 
being admitted to the Union. It is now more than three decades since a state has ad-
opted a new constitution.16 Yet even as constitutional revision has decreased, the pace 
of constitutional amendment has quickened, reflecting a preference for piecemeal 
change or perhaps a distrust of comprehensive reforms.17 Some of these piecemeal 
changes have themselves initiated major shifts in the states---consider, for example, the 
broad impact on policy and politics of introducing direct democracy, imposing term 
13  See TRACTENBERG, Paul L. Education. In: WILLIAMS, Robert F.; TARR, G. Alan (Ed.). State Constitutions for 
the Twenty-first Century. vol. 3. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006.
14  See TARR, G. Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. ch. 1; 
and WILLIAMS, Robert F. The Law of American State Constitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. ch.5.
15  KOGAN, Vladimir. The Irony of Comprehensive State Constitutional Reform. Rutgers Law Journal, Camden, 
vol. 41, n. 4, p. 881-905, july 2010. p. 888.
16  Georgia in 1982 was the last state to adopt a new constitution. For discussion of the public’s unwillingness to 
undertake comprehensive constitutional reform, see TARR, G. Alan. Introduction. In: WILLIAMS, Robert F.; TARR, 
G. Alan (Ed.). State Constitutions for the Twenty-first Century. vol. 3. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2006; and CAIN, Bruce E.; NOLL, Roger G. Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional 
Reform. Texas Law Review, Austin, vol. 87, n. 7, p. 1517-1544, june 2009. p. 1544.
17  TARR, G. Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. p. 139-144; 
and CAIN, Bruce E. Constitutional Revision in California: The Triumph of Amendment over Revision. In: WIL-
LIAMS, Robert F.; TARR, G. Alan (Ed.). State Constitutions for the Twenty-first Century. vol. 1. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2005. p. 59
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limits, or instituting balanced-budget requirements.18 Nonetheless, most amendments 
have been far narrower, addressing specific problems, overruling disfavored judicial de-
cisions, constitutionalizing particular public policies, clarifying obscure constitutional 
language, or dealing with other mundane problems. Yet if this is true, what accounts for 
these peaks and valleys of constitutional reform?  
Other questions pertain to the substance of reform. Insofar as states include 
provisions in their constitutions without analogue in the federal Constitution, where 
do they get the ideas that they include?  An obvious answer is “from other state consti-
tutions,” and certainly interstate constitutional borrowing is widespread, facilitated by 
collections of state constitutions in the nineteenth century, by constitutional commis-
sions in the twentieth, and by the internet in the twenty-first.19  But this ultimately begs 
the question, because some state provisions have no analogue in other state constitu-
tions, and even provisions now common to several state constitutions had to originate 
somewhere.  And with regard to such provisions, why do some states choose to include 
them in their charters, whereas others do not?  
2. THE PATTERN OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
If skepticism about comprehensive constitutional reform dominated most of 
the twentieth century, it was not true throughout the century. The adoption of the 
Michigan Constitution of 1963 inaugurated a period during which state constitutional 
revision was common and efforts to revise state constitutions even more common. 
From 1920-1960, only four states revised their constitutions.20 But from 1960-1976, nine 
18  On the effects of direct democracy in the states, see SMITH, Daniel A.; TOLBERT, Caroline J. Educated by 
initiative: the effects of direct democracy on citizens and political organizations in the American States. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004; and BOWLER, Shaun; GLAZER, Amihai. Direct democracy’s im-
pact on American political institutions. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. On the effects of term limits, 
see CARESS, Stanley M.; KUNIOKA, Todd T. Term limits and their consequences: the aftermath of legislative 
reform. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012; and SARBAUGH-THOMPSON, Marjorie. Political and 
institutional effects of term limits. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. On the effects of balanced-bud-
get requirements, see BRIFFAULT, Richard. Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State 
Constitutional Law. Rutgers Law Journal, Camden, vol. 34, n. 4, p. 907-957, june/sept. 2003; and  SUPER, David 
A. Rethinking Fiscal Federalism. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, vol. 118, n. 8, p. 2544-2652, june 2005.
19  On twentieth-century constitutional commissions, see RICH, Bennett M. Revision by Constitutional Com-
mission. In: GRAVES, W. Brooke (Ed.). Major problems in State Constitutional revision. Chicago: Public Ad-
ministration Service, 1960; and for materials available online during the twenty-first century, see the web site 
of the Center for State Constitutional Studies at camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/frontpage.html .  A pertinent 
local example: When Michigan created an environmental article in 1963, it drew its inspiration from the Alaska 
Constitution, and other states would later emulate Michigan.  See ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the 
wrong places: why State Constitutions contain America’s positive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013. p. 164, and DEMPSEY, Dave. Ruin and recovery: Michigan’s rise as a conservation leader. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2001.
20  States revising their constitutions during this period included Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, and New Jersey. 
During the 1950’s, Hawaii and Alaska adopted constitutions, when they were admitted to the Union. See TARR, 
G. Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. p. 137, tbl. 5.1.
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states adopted new constitutions; conventions in three other states proposed consti-
tutions that ultimately were rejected by voters; and five additional state legislatures 
proposed conventions to revise their state constitutions, only to have their convention 
calls rejected by the voters.21 To understand what might account for this surge in activ-
ity and for state constitutional change more generally, it is useful to review the scholarly 
literature on constitutional politics, recognizing that the various explanations are not 
mutually exclusive and that no single explanation can account for all state constitu-
tional change. 
3. ELITE ENTRENCHMENT
The most influential recent analysis of constitutional politics is Ran Hirschl’s To-
ward Juristocracy.22  Studying constitutional change in Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and 
South Africa, Hirschl found that the dominant political elites in those countries were the 
primary proponents of constitutional reform. Those in power sought to enshrine their 
political preferences in the constitution, in order to make it more difficult for their politi-
cal opponents to repudiate them should they gain power, that is, to insulate them from 
democratic forces.  In some instances, the changes the elites introduced were designed 
to make it more difficult to remove them from office, as when they enlarged or con-
tracted the electorate or banned competing political parties in order to cement their 
hold on power. In other instances the changes involved constitutionalizing favored 
policies, thereby “moving policy-making authority from majoritarian decision-making 
arenas to the courts,” particularly when shifting political fortunes made the prospect of 
their political opponents attaining power more likely and when those in power “pos-
sess disproportionate access to and influence over the legal arena.”23 As one commen-
tator framed it, “rights are created by dominant regimes in an attempt to maintain the 
status quo by ushering the judiciary into politics.”24
21  The states adopting  new constitutions include: Michigan, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Montana, Louisiana, and Georgia.  States in which voters rejected proposed constitutions include 
Maryland, New Mexico, and New York. States in which voters rejected convention calls include Data are drawn 
from STURM, Albert L. Thirty years of State Constitution-making: 1938-1968. New York: National Munici-
pal League, 1970; and STURM, Albert L. State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision: 1978-79 and the 
1970’s. In: The Book of the States, 1980-81. Lexington: Council of State Governments, 1980. 
22  HIRSCHL, Ran. Toward Juristocracy: the origins and consequences of the new constitutionalism. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. For analysis of Hirschl’s argument with particular attention to American 
constitutionalism, both federal and state, see GRABER, Mark A. Symposium: The Maryland/Georgetown Con-
stitutional Law Schmooze – Foreword from the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and the Political 
Construction of Judicial Power. The Maryland Law Review, Baltimore, vol. 65, n. 1, p. 1-14, 2006.
23  HIRSCHL, Ran. Toward Juristocracy: the origins and consequences of the new constitutionalism. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. p. 11-12.
24  ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the wrong places: why State Constitutions contain America’s pos-
itive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. p. 14. Zackin pioneered applying Hirschl’s analysis to 
state constitutional change.
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Although Hirschl developed his theory of hegemonic constitutional change in 
analyzing national constitutional change in several foreign countries, his analysis has 
application to constitutional change in the United States as well. At the federal level, 
the Reconstruction amendments might be seen as an instance of hegemonic consti-
tutional change, because the Republicans sought to enshrine favored rights and poli-
cies in the Constitution before the Democrats regained political power. The Fifteenth 
Amendment, which enlarged the electorate in a way that benefited the Republican 
Party at a time when the Democratic Party’s political fortunes were rising, likewise fits 
Hirschl’s model.25 But in a country in which it is extremely difficult to amend the Consti-
tution, one can also find instances in which the prevailing political forces sought to en-
trench their favored views not by changing the text of the constitution but by changing 
its interpretation through the appointment of sympathetic judges.26 Thus the funda-
mental constitutional shift that validated the New Deal occurred not by constitutional 
amendment but by Franklin Roosevelt’s appointments to the Supreme Court. It may 
also be that the failed appointment of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court represented 
a repudiation of conservative Republicans’ efforts to realign the Court once again.27  
At the state level, one example of hegemonic constitutionalism (among many) 
might be the amendments adopted when the Progressives gained political power in 
California in 1911. Under the leadership of Governor Hiram Johnson, the Progressives 
used a series of constitutional amendments to constitutionalize major elements of their 
political agenda. These amendments that established a railroad commission to regu-
late all public utilities, revised the tax system to shift more of the burden to banks and 
corporations, provided for employers’ liability, secured a minimum wage, enhanced 
governmental powers of eminent domain, and introduced other reforms.28 Another 
example involves the adoption of new constitutions in the South following the end 
of Reconstruction, with the primary aim of disenfranchising African-American voters 
and thereby ensuring the dominance of the white elite in the Democratic Party.29 More 
25  See the discussion in ACKERMAN, Bruce. We the People: Transformations. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998. 
chs. 4-8.
26  On the extraordinary difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution, in contrast to other national constitutions, 
see LUTZ, Donald S. Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment. American Political Science Review, vol. 
88, n. 2, p. 355-370, 1994.
27  This is the argument presented in ACKERMAN, Bruce. We the People: Foundations. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 1991. ch. 5.
28  On these developments, see DEALEY, James Q. Growth of American State Constitutions from 1776 to the 
end of the year 1914. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1915. p. 107-108; OLIN JR., Spencer C. California’s prodigal 
sons: Hiram Johnson and the progressives 1911-1917.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. p. 12-17; 
and GRODIN, Joseph R.; MASSEY, Calvin R.; CUNNINGHAM, Richard B. The California State Constitution. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 8-9.
29  On this “restoration” and entrenchment of the white elite, see J KOUSSER, J. Morgan. The shaping of south-
ern politics: suffrage restrictions and the establishment of the one-party south: 1890-1910. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1974; MCMILLAN, Malcolm C. Constitutional development in Alabama, 1789-1901: a study 
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recently, one might also view the adoption restricting marriage to opposite-sex cou-
ples as an attempt by those with political power to enshrine their values in the consti-
tution, although here the judiciary was seen as a possible threat to those values rather 
than as an ally enforcing them.30 A particularly egregious recent example of  a political 
elite seeking to control state constitutional change for its own advantage occurred in 
Louisiana in 1992, when Governor Edwin Edwards called a special session of the legis-
lature, which designated itself as a constitutional convention and wrote a constitution. 
The voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposed constitution, and the governor later 
publicly apologized to the state.31
4. OUTSIDER GROUPS
An alternative understanding, more or less the polar opposite of Hirschl’s, views 
constitutional change as originating with groups that find themselves stymied by the 
ordinary political processes in the states and therefore execute an “end run” around 
those processes by appealing directly to the people.  Often these activists are seek-
ing major constitutional changes—they hope, in Emily Zackin’s words, “to rewrite the 
rules of politics and transform their societies.”32 In some instances outsider groups may 
wish to constitutionalize mandates so they can enlist courts in enforcing them.  This, for 
example, was the aim of the environmental movement when it proposed that environ-
mental protections be inserted into state constitutions in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.33  In other instances outsider groups may wish to avoid judicial involvement, 
contra Hirschl, seeking instead through their additions to the constitution to activate 
state legislatures and neutralize a judiciary that they perceived as hostile. Labor groups 
in politics, the negro, and sectionalism. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1955; and PERMAN, 
Michael. The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics: 1869-1879. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1984.
30  Altogether, twenty-nine states have adopted constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
See <http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/state-doma-laws.aspx>.
31  See W HARGRAVE, W. Lee. The Louisiana State Constitution. Oxoford: Oxford University Press, 2011. In 
1970 new constitutions were proposed by the legislatures of Idaho, Oregon, and Virginia, but only the Virginia 
proposal was ratified by voters. See STURM, Albert L. Thirty years of State Constitution-making: 1938-1968. 
New York: National Municipal League, 1970. p. 80.
32  ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the wrong places: why State Constitutions contain America’s pos-
itive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. p. 4. In her study of the addition of education rights 
in the nineteenth century, labor rights in the early twentieth century, and environmental rights in the 1970s 
and thereafter, Zackin found that the “leaders of each constitutional movement maintained that government’s 
obligation to protect its people was too important to remain optional, and the protections they sought were 
too critical to leave at the mercy of legislative discretion.”(3)
33  ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the wrong places: why State Constitutions contain America’s posi-
tive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. ch. 7.
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in the early twentieth century employed just such a preemptive approach.34  Finally, 
in some instances outsider groups may seek to constitutionalize policies because they 
distrust state legislatures and wish to preclude their involvement in policy.  Thus in New 
York conservation groups that feared the legislature would not be sympathetic to their 
concerns inserted the “forever wild” provisions in the state’s constitution.35 
This understanding of state constitutional politics as outsider politics makes 
sense particularly in those states that have the constitutional initiative, which allows 
insurgent groups to propose constitutional amendments without going through the 
state legislature.36 It also may apply when an automatic convention call provides an op-
portunity to mount a constitutional offensive.37 They can either campaign for a conven-
tion or use the prospect of a convention to induce legislators to propose constitutional 
changes to deal with problems that if left unaddressed, might be used to rally public 
support for a convention. However, in states in which only the legislature may propose 
a constitutional amendment or authorize a vote on whether to call a convention, out-
sider groups may find themselves with little recourse. Constitutional change may be 
completely blocked, and dissatisfaction may fester. 
In the early nineteenth century, groups disadvantaged by prevailing constitu-
tional arrangements, particularly systems of legislative apportionment, were some-
times able to pressure state legislatures into calling conventions. Yet because the 
representation at those conventions typically mirrored the prevailing distribution of 
power in the state, the demands of underrepresented areas were seldom fully met.38 In 
other instances outsider groups have been able to achieve some constitutional change 
by agreeing beforehand not to challenge strongly defended privileges, as occurred 
during the adoption of a new constitution in New Jersey in 1947. Rural legislators for 
34  ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the wrong places: why State Constitutions contain America’s posi-
tive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. ch. 6.
35  ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the wrong places: why State Constitutions contain America’s posi-
tive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. p. 29-32.
36  Eighteen states have adopted the constitutional initiative. For a listing, see the web site of the Initiative and 
Referendum Institute, at <http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm>.  It should be noted that the 
initiative does not necessarily empower political outsiders. Incumbent politicians have also proved adept at 
using at using the constitutional initiative to advance their own political agendas.  Former governor Peter Wil-
son of California is a prime example.  See MCCOY, Candace. Crime as a Bogeyman: Why Californians Changed 
Their Constitution to Create a Victims’ Bill of Rights. In: TARR, G. Alan (Ed.). Constitutional politics in the States: 
contemporary controversies and historical patterns. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1996. 
37  Fourteen states mandate that a ballot question as to whether to call a constitutional convention be periodi-
cally submitted to the citizenry. See BENJAMIN, Gerald. Constitutional Amendment and Revision. In: WILLIAMS, 
Robert F.; TARR, G. Alan (Ed.). State Constitutions for the Twenty-first Century. vol. 3. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2006. p. 93.
38  TARR, G. Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. p. 102-105. 
Virginia was a prime example of regional conflict rooted in the constitution’s favoritism toward the coastal 
regions, regardless of population shifts.  See DINAN, John. The Virginia State Constitution. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011.
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many years had blocked a constitutional convention because they wanted to protect 
the equal representation of counties in the Senate, and they only agreed to a conven-
tion after a deal was struck ensuring that the convention would not address legislative 
apportionment.39   Finally, when the legislature refused to call a convention in Rhode Is-
land in the early 1840’s, dissatisfied citizens convened an unofficial convention, drafted 
a constitution, and held elections under the new constitution.  But the Dorr Rebellion 
(as it was called) had an unhappy ending, and such a challenge to duly constituted 
state authority is hardly imaginable today.40 In sum, outsider groups typically achieve 
major constitutional change only when there is an available alternative to the normal 
political process.  
5. ORDINARY POLITICS
Implicit in both Hirschl’s and Zackin’s analyses is the view that constitutional 
politics involve a continuation of the “ordinary politics” of group advantage, albeit 
conducted in a different political arena. Much of the literature on constitutional con-
ventions supports this interpretation.  Those who serve as delegates in constitutional 
conventions are usually already active in state or local politics, particularly when po-
litical parties control the nomination of candidates and the election of delegates is 
by partisan ballot, and convention deliberations may be affected by the same inter-
est groups that seek to influence the legislative and executive branches.  The divisions 
within conventions may track the partisan divide among delegates, particularly when 
the convention is organized along political party lines, and what emerges from the del-
egates’ deliberations may reflect the partisan division within the convention.  Indeed, 
in Minnesota in 1857 the Democratic and Republican delegates split into separate con-
ventions which each proposed its own constitution.41  If the partisan balance within the 
convention mirrors the partisan balance in the state legislature, the delegates are likely 
to resist dramatic changes that might endanger their party’s predominance. If the parti-
san balance within the convention differs from that in the state legislature, the majority 
delegates may use the opportunity to incorporate policy changes in the constitution 
or seek to introduce changes that could undermine that predominance. Insofar as this 
understanding of constitutional politics is correct, state constitutions can be expected 
39  See CONNORS, Richard J. The process of constitutional revision in New Jersey: 1940-1947. New York: 
National Municipal League, 1970.
40  See GETTLEMAN, Marvin E. The Dorr rebellion: a study in American radicalism: 1823-1849. New York: Ran-
dom House, 1973; and on extraconstitutional conventions more generally, see HENRETTA, James A. The Rise 
and Decline of “Democratic-Republicanism”: Political Rights in New York and the Several States. In: FINKELMAN, 
Paul; GOTTLEIB, Stephen (Ed.). Toward a usable past: liberty under State Constitutions. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1991. p. 62-63.
41   MORRISON, Mary Jane. The Minnesota State Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
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to register the results of group conflict within the state at the time at which their various 
provisions were adopted. 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence supporting this understanding of con-
stitutional politics as ordinary politics. Take, for example, the notion that insofar as the 
convention replicates the political divisions in the state, there is little reason to expect 
dramatic constitutional change. The Rhode Island convention of 1964 offers a prime 
example. When the Democratic Party was disadvantaged by a malapportioned state 
legislature in the 1930s, it argued for an unlimited convention and hoped to introduce 
dramatic changes.  But by the early 1960s, the Democrats had secured a firm control 
of the legislature, and so they opposed major changes. Ultimately, the legislature did 
acquiesce in an unlimited convention, but it mandated partisan election of delegates, 
ensuring that the Democrats would control the convention.  When the convention met, 
it “tidied up” the constitution and eliminated obsolete provisions, such as the $300 an-
nual salary for legislators, but it did not significantly reform state government in ways 
that might diminish the Democrats’ power or make it less secure.42  
Or take the notion that when the delegates to a convention differ in their orienta-
tion from the state legislature, they are more likely to propose significant constitutional 
reforms. One example is the New York convention of 1967, in which Democrats enjoyed 
a majority at a time that Republicans dominated the state legislature. The Democratic 
delegates championed the elimination of literacy and property requirements for voting, 
hoping thereby to enlarge the electorate in a way that would enhance their prospects 
in subsequent elections. They also proposed greater decentralization of power to local 
governments, which they were more likely to control.  Finally, the Democratic delegates 
wrote into the proposed constitution policies unlikely to be embraced by their political 
opponents in the state legislature, including provisions for the education and protec-
tion of consumers, a commitment that the state foster and promote economic security, 
and a repeal of the Blaine Amendment that prohibited public aid to denominational 
schools.43  The Maryland convention of 1967-1968, in which delegates were chosen in 
non-partisan elections, offers another example. Elected without party labels and thus 
freed from partisan attachments, the Maryland delegates mandated “major changes in 
the bill of rights, in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, in local government, 
and elsewhere, [thereby] very substantially moderniz[ing] and streamlin[ing] the state’s 
basic law.”44  However, these attempts in New York and Maryland to pursue policies 
42  CORNWELL JR., Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the poli-
tics of the revision process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 19-20; 134-135.
43  CORNWELL JR., Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the poli-
tics of the revision process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 136.
44  CORNWELL JR., Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the poli-
tics of the revision process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 140.
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opposed by the dominant political forces in the state led to electoral defeat, as substan-
tial majorities rejected the proposed constitutions.45
Yet political realities in the states may be more complicated than these exam-
ples suggest.  For one thing, there may not be partisan divisions on the primary issues 
confronting a state contemplating constitutional change.  For example, in the mid-
twentieth century both Republicans and Democrats tended to favor fewer outdated 
restrictions on the legislature, a more coherently organized executive, and a unified 
judiciary.  Thus despite the strong partisan divisions in New Jersey at the outset of the 
1947 convention, “there was a wide area of agreement among civic organizations and 
enlightened political leaders of both parties concerning what needed to be done.”46 For 
another thing, the balance of political forces may be changing in the state at the time a 
convention is called—indeed, the transition may itself provide the impetus for calling a 
convention.  Several conventions in the 1840’s arose from just such a political shift.  The 
economic collapse of the late 1830’s revealed that states had borrowed excessively and 
unwisely underwritten corporate ventures to develop infrastructure (railroads, canals, 
turnpikes, bridges, etc.), in part from promotional enthusiasm and in part because of 
corruption.47 These promotional policies were popular before the collapse, but public 
opinion shifted dramatically, and several states called conventions for the express pur-
pose of reining in state legislatures and preventing future abuses.48 In the twentieth 
century the period of greatest constitutional revision coincided to a considerable ex-
tent with the reapportionment revolution that changed the balance of political forces 
in most states (which is discussed in greater detail below). 
It should also be noted that not all constitutional conventions divide along 
partisan lines.  Such divisions are less likely if delegates are selected in non-partisan 
elections, if the conventions are not organized along partisan lines, and if there are 
divisions within the political parties (e.g., urban vs. rural). Even when partisan divisions 
do surface, they may appear on only a select set of issues that divide the parties rather 
than on the full range of issues the convention is addressing. For example, in the New 
Jersey convention of 1947, there were few divisions among the delegates along par-
tisan lines, with the primary one involving whether to guarantee in the constitution a 
45  CORNWELL JR., Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the poli-
tics of the revision process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 161, tbl. 6.1.
46  BEBOUT, John H.; HARRISON, Joseph. The Working of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947. William and 
Mary Law Review, Williamsburg, vol. 10, n. 2, p. 337-365, 1968. p. 341.
47  On the states’ promotional efforts, see TARR, G. Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 2000. p. 109-112.
48  See SHUGERMAN, Jed Handelsman. The people’s Courts: pursuing judicial independence in America. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2012. chs. 4-5.
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right to collective bargaining.49 Moreover, the delegates may view themselves and their 
responsibilities as distinctive, more concerned with the future of the state than with 
immediate political advantage. Bruce Ackerman has argued that Americans distinguish 
between ordinary politics and higher law-making, and this may hold true of convention 
delegates as well. They may view their responsibilities as requiring a longer time per-
spective than is generally expected of legislators and an obligation to rise “above poli-
tics” and pursue the public interest.50 My own discussions with convention delegates 
confirm this perception—as the last living delegate to the 1947 New Jersey convention 
put it, “I knew my colleagues well, and they were politicians before the convention and 
politicians after the convention, but at the convention they were statesmen.”51 
Finally, concerns about ratification may constrain what delegates do, even 
when they have a secure majority in the convention. Realizing that voter opposition 
to particular provisions may lead them to reject the entire constitution, delegates may 
temper their search for partisan advantage out of fear that clearly partisan proposals 
could excite controversy and offer political opponents a basis for rallying opposition to 
the constitution.52 They may also decide to submit controversial proposals separately, 
lest opposition to one or more of those proposals doom the entire document. In 1970 
in Illinois, for example, by separately submitting to voters four contested issues (the 
eighteen-year-old vote, capital punishment, election or appointment of judges, and 
single-member or multi-member legislative districts), the delegates virtually ensured 
49  This guarantee – New Jersey Const., Art. I, sec. 19-- was approved by the delegates on close to a party-line 
vote.   
50  ACKERMAN, Bruce. We the People: Foundations. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1991. chs. 1; 10.  Elmer Corn-
well suggests that a sizable number of delegates come to the convention with such a “statesman” orientation, 
though for some that orientation changes as a result of their experience as delegates.  See CORNWELL JR., 
Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the politics of the revision 
process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. ch. 3.
51  Statement of Wesley Lance, delegate to the 1947 New Jersey Constitutional Convention, found in the PBS 
documentary The Opportunity of a Century (1997), copy on file with author.
52  Vladimir Kogan has observed that voting on ratification is largely cue voting, which “means that, even if 
delegates at a constitutional convention work carefully to give every group in the electorate a reason to vote 
in favor of the proposed changes, there is little guarantee that voters will actually know all the details when 
the revisions appear on the ballot. Second, voters do not appear to weigh the costs and benefits of various 
policy proposals in a risk-neutral manner, in the same way that an actuary might compare two courses of 
action by carefully adding up the risk and reward of each one. In studying the behavior of voters in initiative 
elections, political scientists Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan have argued that many voters are fundamental-
ly risk-averse, preferring to vote against ballot measures in the face of controversy, uncertainty, or confusion.” 
(Kogan is here referencing BOWLER, Shaun; DONOVAN, Todd. Demanding Choices: opinion, voting, and direct 
democracy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998.) Kogan further noted: “By expanding the scope 
of constitutional change, major revisions are more likely to unite small groups, each opposed to a particular 
provision, into a coalition of sufficient size to block the package of proposals. If each provision were considered 
separately by the voters, no group of opponents would be large enough to be decisive in the election. When 
these provisions are brought together in a logroll, however, the final package is more likely to contain enough 
“poison pills” to bring together a majority against their passage.” (KOGAN, Vladimir. The Irony of Comprehensive 
State Constitutional Reform. Rutgers Law Journal, Camden, vol. 41, n. 4, p. 881-905, july 2010. p. 886).
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ratification of the constitution.53 But when delegates ignore how the voters might per-
ceive their efforts, they have often seen their proposals rejected.54 
6. CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION
During the twentieth century, proponents of state constitutional reform argued 
that revision of state constitutions was necessary not only to deal with specific prob-
lems but also because the state’s constitutional machinery was outdated, inadequate 
for dealing with the needs of a changing society, and so had to be modernized. Thus, 
when states confronted particular crises, as Michigan did with its financial crisis of the 
late 1950’s, they often were willing to undertake a comprehensive review of their state 
constitution, with the idea of updating them in response to changes in society, chang-
es in attitudes, and their experience under existing constitutional arrangements.55 The 
idea that constitutions require periodic updating was hardly new. It can be traced back 
to Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that “laws and institutions must go hand in hand with 
the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, 
as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change 
with the circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.”56 
But the notion gained greater currency during the mid-twentieth century, be-
cause organized reform groups had for decades kept up a full-scale assault on the ef-
ficiency, effectiveness, and probity of state governments. A few quotes give the flavor 
of the critique. The federal Commission on Intergovernmental Relations opined that 
“many state constitutions restrict the scope, effectiveness, and adaptability of State 
53  CORNWELL JR., Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the poli-
tics of the revision process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 174-175.
54  In assessing the claim that state constitutional politics represent a continuation of ordinary politics, one 
should also take into account the politics of constitutional amendment and consider the role of interest groups 
as well as political parties.  On the latter, with particular reference to how related groups in different states 
cooperate to advance their common goals, see ZACKIN, Emily. Looking for rights in all the wrong places: 
why State Constitutions contain America’s positive rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.  Writing 
of education interest groups in the nineteenth century, she notes: “Although they were organized at the state 
level, these groups stayed in continuous contact with one another.” (p. 69) What was true of education interest 
groups in nineteenth century has been even more true of groups in later eras. Thus, writing of environmen-
tal groups in the mid-twentieth century, Zackin observed: “Activists who understood problems as national 
in scope still worked to forge nationwide policies through the coordination of state governments and state 
constitutional mandates.”(p. 158)
55  On the impetus for the Michigan convention of 1961-1962, see FINO, Susan P. The Michigan State Consti-
tution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 22-24.
56  Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in PETERSON, Merrill D. (Ed.). The Portable Thomas Jefferson. 
New York: Viking Press, 1975. p. 559. Jefferson wrote in the same letter: “Some men look at constitutions with 
sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe 
to the men of the preceding era a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amend-
ment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it.  It was very like the present, but without the 
experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading.”(p. 
558-559)
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and local action. These self-imposed constitutional limitations make it difficult for many 
States to perform all of the services their citizens require.”57 Governor Terry Sanford of 
North Carolina was even more outspoken, referring to state constitutions as “the drag 
anchors of state programs, and permanent cloaks for the protection of special inter-
ests and points of view.”58 The Committee for Economic Development concurred, rec-
ommending that “state constitutional revision should have highest priority in restruc-
turing state governments to meet modern needs,” and that “most states should hold 
constitutional conventions, at the earliest possible date, in order to draft completely 
new documents.”59 The National Municipal League published and regularly updated 
a Model State Constitution in order to guide the task of constitutional reform.60 The 
reformers’ concerns are perhaps best summed up in Robert Allen’s tirade: “State gov-
ernment is the tawdriest, most stultifying unit of the nation’s political structure. In state 
government are to be found in their most extreme and vicious forms all the worst evils 
of misrule in this country.”61 
Several things are noteworthy about these calls for constitutional moderniza-
tion. First, the proponents of reform were speaking to a potentially receptive audience, 
given the widespread American distrust of government and cynicism about its probity 
and effectiveness.62  The idea that fundamental change might be necessary thus did 
not seem unreasonable, although it competed with popular skepticism about whether 
reformers could produce the results they promised. Second, the call for modernization 
was consciously framed as non-partisan and non-ideological—who could oppose a 
more efficient and effective state government? Yet the modernizers’ claim of political 
57  THE COMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. A Report to the President for Transmittal to Con-
gress. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955. p. V. “Our states are attempting to provide governmental 
services in twentieth century conditions under the outmoded and hampering restrictions which abound in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century constitutions.”
58  SANFORD, Terry. Storm Over States. Columbus: McGraw-Hill, 1967. p. 189. He notes that outdated state 
constitutions have in particular fostered a corrupt legislative process: “To indict the states is to indict the legis-
latures that legislatures are inefficient and corrupt, that they procrastinate on public business while habitually 
kowtowing to private economic interests, that legislators get drunk and disorderly and consort with ladies 
procured by avaricious lobbyists, that they line their pockets, scratch their own backs and roll their own logs, all 
the while stamping out progressive legislation in the name of protecting their constituents.” (p. 39) 
59  COMMITTEE ON STATE GOVERNMENT OF THE NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE (Ed.). The Model State Consti-
tution. 4. ed. New York: National Municipal League, 1941. p. 19; 68.  
60  See COMMITTEE ON STATE GOVERNMENT OF THE NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE (Ed.). The Model State 
Constitution. 4. ed. New York: National Municipal League, 1941, which also contains essays explaining the 
League’s recommendations and, more generally, GRAVES, W. Brooke (Ed.). Major problems in State Constitu-
tional revision. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1960.
61  ALLEN, Robert S. Our Sovereign State. New York: Vanguard Press, 1949. p. VIII. Allen also charged that state 
constitutions bore “no more resemblance to a constitution than a garbage dump does to a park.” (p. XVI)
62  See E DIONNE JR., E. J. Why Americans Hate Politics. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991; and more generally 
LIPSET, Seymour Martin. The Confidence Gap: business, labor, and government in the public mind. New York: 
The Free Press, 1983; If anything, support for government has declined since the constitutional reformers first 
sought to eliminate the causes of governmental ineffectiveness and unresponsiveness.
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neutrality was suspect: people rarely engage in political advocacy without considering 
what groups and interests might be benefited by a particular course of action, and so 
analysis of who is urging change can be instructive in assessing its likely effects. Thus, 
some commentators have charged that “many reforms were tailored specifically to ben-
efit the reformers themselves—mainly corporate and business interests—who sought 
to change state government to better accommodate their own needs for a more pre-
dictable, manageable political climate.”63  Third, implicit in the very call for constitu-
tional revision was the assumption that the manifest deficiencies of state governments 
were largely tied to problems in the basic law, that the problems were institutional 
rather than political.  Finally, the idea of “modernization” was (perhaps intentionally?) 
vague, and undertaking constitutional modernization would thus require replacing this 
vagueness with a concrete set of reforms for improving state government. For the con-
stitutional modernizers, this provided an opportunity--even as they denied that there 
was a single template applicable to all state constitutions, their publications put forth 
a clear agenda for action, drawing heavily on the reform ideas of the Progressive era.64 
What the constitutional modernizers wanted was to restructure state govern-
ment so that it could act more forcefully in addressing the problems confronting the 
states.  The modernizers favored enhancing the power of state governments and repeal-
ing limitations that prevent constructive legislative and executive action. They believed 
that state legislatures should be professionalized, meeting annually without time limits 
on the length of their meetings, and supplied with adequate salary and staff resources 
for what the reformers saw as a full-time job. They favored eliminating most constitu-
tional restrictions on the legislature, which they dismissed as the unfortunate product 
of eras in which demands on state government were fewer, so that legislators could re-
spond vigorously to the problems confronting the state.65 Modernizers also proposed 
streamlining the executive branch under the control of the governor. They wanted the 
myriad boards and agencies in state executives combined into a limited number of 
departments under the control of the governor, the elimination of the independent 
63  See BOWMAN, Anne O’Malley; KEARNEY, Richard C. The Resurgence of the States. New Jersey: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1986. p. 48. This is particularly obvious in the case of so-called merit selection of judges; the propo-
nents were of this reform were typically business interests, with strong support from the organized bar.  See 
SHUGERMAN, Jed Handelsman. The people’s Courts: pursuing judicial independence in America. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012. ch. 10.
64  See TARR, G. Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. p. 
155-156. For elaborations of the reform agenda, see GRAVES, W. Brooke (Ed.). Major problems in State Con-
stitutional revision. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1960; COMMITTEE ON STATE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE (Ed.). The Model State Constitution. 4. ed. New York: National Municipal 
League, 1941. The discussion in this paragraph is based on these sources.
65  As Brooke Graves put it, the restrictions on state legislatures “add up to a lack of confidence in the legislative 
organs of the government.”  They become “an incubus preventing the adoption of modern legislation and 
tying the living present to the dead past.” (GRAVES, W. Brooke (Ed.). Major problems in State Constitutional 
revision. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1960. p. 17).
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election of other executive officials, and a strengthening of the fiscal powers of the 
governor through the executive budget, the line-item veto, and other devices. They 
also believed that the state judiciary should be consolidated into a unified court system 
under the administrative authority of the chief justice, its funding provided by the state 
government rather than local governments, and its judges chosen by merit selection 
rather than by contested elections. Finally, they proposed enhancing the powers of lo-
cal government through guarantees of home rule. Given the modernizers’ emphasis on 
a concise document with clear lines of authority and few restrictions on the exercise of 
that authority, a leading federalism scholar characterized their proposals as rooted in a 
“managerial model” of state constitutionalism.66 
In the era following World War II, the modernizers enjoyed considerable suc-
cess. Some of this success occurred through piecemeal reform—for example, from 
1947 to 1995, state voters approved ninety percent of amendments proposed to re-
form state executive branches, and from 1965 to 1975 twenty states comprehensively 
restructured their executive branches, while another  twenty reorganized at least one 
executive agency or department.67 But much of their success occurred when states cre-
ated their initial constitutions or revised their existing constitutions. The delegates who 
drafted the 1947 New Jersey Constitution, the 1950 Hawaii Constitution, and the 1956 
Alaska Constitution all drew heavily on the reform literature.68  In the latter two cases 
the need to create an entirely new framework of government meant that there were no 
pre-existing power centers to oppose the reform prescriptions. In the New Jersey case, 
a bipartisan consensus that the state’s 1844 constitution was hopelessly outdated en-
couraged an openness to new ideas—as Robert Williams has observed, “The difficulty 
in achieving constitutional revision had permitted a consensus to build around the ma-
jor reforms that were finally adopted.”69 
When Michigan and other states undertook constitutional revision in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s, they too looked to the modernizers for ideas about what should be in-
cluded in a well-designed state constitution. State constitutional commissions, groups 
of experts formed to prepare materials for the delegates, played a crucial role in dis-
seminating the reform perspective.70  In a study of seven constitutional conventions 
66  ELAZAR, Daniel J. The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions. Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism, Oxford, vol. 12, n. 1, p. 11-25, jan./mar. 1982. p. 22.
67  GARNETT, James L. Reorganizing State Government: the Executive Branch. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. 
p. 55.
68  See generally LEE, Anne Fedder. The Hawaii State Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; and 
MCBEATH, Gerald A. The Alaska State Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
69  WILLIAMS, Robert F. The New Jersey State Constitution. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
70  TARR, G. Alan. Understanding State Constitutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. p. 154. 
Michigan prepared for its convention by appointing a commission to in 1960, which produced materials to in-
form and guide its convention delegates. An independent group, the Citizens Research Council, also developed 
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held during this period, Elmer Cornwell and his associates found that all the revised 
state constitutions moved closer to the Model State Constitution, some dramatically 
so.71 Michigan’s 1963 constitution was not part of Cornwell’s study, but it too deleted 
obsolete provisions, eliminated statute-like detail, removed earmarks from most taxes, 
strengthened the office of the governor, and reorganized the judiciary.72 
It is hard therefore to gainsay the influence of the modernizers or to dispute 
with Albert Sturm’s conclusion in 1982 that constitutional revision had contributed “to 
the remarkable resurgence and modernization of state government during the past 
20 years.”73  Other commentators have reached similar conclusions.74 Yet the modern-
izers’ record is more mixed than this might suggest.  From 1960-1976 voters in three 
states rejected proposed constitutions, and in five others they rejected proposals to 
call constitutional conventions, suggesting that they were not altogether persuaded of 
the need for constitutional modernization. Indeed, Cornwell’s study of constitutional 
conventions found that voters rejected proposed constitutions precisely in those states 
(Maryland and New Mexico) where delegates had most completely embraced the mod-
ernizers’ suggestions.75 Constitutional modernization was part of the story from 1960-
1976, but it was not the whole story.76
7. EXTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES
Sometimes the impetus for state constitutional change comes from outside the 
state.  A prime example of this is the U.S. Supreme Court’s one person, one vote rulings.77 
Almost all the states were obliged to change their systems of legislative apportionment 
a two-volume analysis of Michigan’s 1908 constitution. See FINO, Susan P. The Michigan State Constitution. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 25.
71  CORNWELL JR., Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the poli-
tics of the revision process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 156-159.
72  FINO, Susan P. The Michigan State Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 26-27 and passim.
73  STURM, Albert L. Thirty years of State Constitution-making: 1938-1968. New York: National Municipal 
League, 1970. p. 115.
74  See TEAFORD, Jon C. The Rise of the States: evolution of American State government. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002; and BOWMAN, Anne O’Malley; KEARNEY, Richard C. The Resurgence of the 
States. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986.
75  CORNWELL JR., Elmer; GOODMAN, Jay S.; SWANSON, Wayne R. State constitutional conventions: the poli-
tics of the revision process in seven States. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. p. 158, tbl. 5.6.
76  It should also be noted that in the decades after 1976 the modernizers’ agenda was largely replaced by 
another reform agenda, focused on ensuring greater governmental responsiveness through direct democracy 
and on imposing limits on state legislatures and courts. See TARR, G. Alan. Understanding State Constitu-
tions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. p. 157-161.
77  In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court ruled that apportionment issues were justiciable.  In 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), it held that “one person, one vote” was the constitutionally prescribed 
standard for apportionment of both houses of state legislatures.  This meant that states had to devise legisla-
tive districts with equal numbers of inhabitants in order to meet Chief Justice Warren’s insistence that popula-
tion be “the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies.”
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in order to conform to the Court’s rulings, and reapportionment was the principal factor 
leading to the calling of conventions in Rhode Island (1964), Connecticut and Tennes-
see (1965), New Jersey (1966), New York (1967), and Hawaii (1968).78 Whereas some 
of these conventions were limited to the issue of reapportionment, in other instances 
states used the occasion of this change to undertake more comprehensive reform. And 
this was not always a matter of design: for example, the 1965 Connecticut convention, 
which was called only to deal with legislative apportionment and propose new amend-
ing procedures, instead proposed a new constitution, which was ratified by voters.79 
Beyond that, post-reapportionment legislatures tended to be more supportive of com-
prehensive reform than were their predecessors. In part, the change in membership as 
a result of reapportionment brought new persons into the state legislature, who had 
not benefited from the practices and arrangements of the past and who consequently 
felt less attachment to them.  In part, the new state legislators had less to fear from 
fundamental constitutional change than did their predecessors, who had blocked the 
calling of constitutional conventions, lest the power they enjoyed be undermined by 
reapportionment. The experience in New Jersey discussed earlier is a case in point. In 
part, too, the new legislators may have found that by blocking of comprehensive re-
form in the past, their predecessors had allowed a number of problems to fester that 
urgently demanded consideration.  Finally, the new legislatures often differed politi-
cally from their malapportioned predecessors and thus may have wanted to introduce 
constitutional changes in line with their priorities.
The impetus for constitutional change may also come from other states. When 
some states have comprehensively reformed their constitutions, there is a pressure for 
other states to follow their example and reap the benefits of reform.80 Thus it is hardly 
surprising that there are periods of intense state constitutional revision as well as pe-
riods of relative inactivity. This process of emulation can apply to individual provisions 
as well as to comprehensive reform. For example, Michigan in 1963 added a strong 
78  STURM, Albert L. Thirty years of State Constitution-making: 1938-1968. New York: National Municipal 
League, 1970. p. 61. On state legislative apportionment pre-Reynolds and on the steps states took following 
that ruling, see DIXON, Robert G. Democratic Representation: reapportionment in law and politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1968; and O’ROURKE, Timothy G. The Impact of Reapportionment. New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 1980.
79  STURM, Albert L. Thirty years of State Constitution-making: 1938-1968. New York: National Municipal 
League, 1970. p. 67.
80  This calls to mind Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous characterization of the states as “laboratories of democra-
cy.” See his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,  311 (1932).  On the transmission 
of constitutional reforms across state borders, often referred to as the diffusion of innovations, see GRAY, Vir-
ginia. Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study. American Political Science Review, Cambridge, vol. 67, n. 
4, p. 1174-1185, dec. 1973.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 2, p. 9-32, maio/ago. 2016.
G. Alan Tarr
28 
environmental guarantee to its constitution because the delegates were inspired by 
and relied upon Alaska’s recent adoption of a similar provision.81
8. CONCLUSION
Writing in the late twentieth century, scholars described a “conventionphobia” 
rooted in popular distrust of the fundamental changes that might be introduced by 
constitutional revision.82  Even when voters were willing to authorize conventions, they 
tended to prefer piecemeal change rather than the creation of new constitutions.  Thus 
the successful conventions in Rhode Island (1973, 1986), New Hampshire (1974, 1984), 
Arkansas (1978-1980), Hawaii (1978), and Tennessee (1977) all involved the submission 
of specific amendments to the voters.83  Change via constitutional amendments pro-
posed by the legislature, by the constitutional initiative, or in Florida by constitutional 
commission likewise superseded more comprehensive reform.  But this is not unprec-
edented: the frequency of constitutional revision has fluctuated throughout American 
history, and it is not inconceivable that in the future states will again embrace compre-
hensive constitutional reform.  Should they do so, it is likely that the same dynamics of 
constitutional change described in this article will again operate.  Until then, much can 
be gained by reflecting on the last great period of state constitutional revision, in which 
Michigan played an important role.  
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